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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for two counts of: 
assault by a prisoner, 3rd degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990), and one count of escape from 
official custody, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-309 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 930212-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Butterfield's rule 404(b) character evidence claim is 
properly before this Court. Even though Mr. Butterfield's parolee 
status was minimally relevant in the sense that it provided an 
additional justification for arresting him, it was merely 
cumulative and its prejudice far outweighed its probative value. 
Defense counsel's mention of his parolee status was the direct 
result of the State's opposition to his motion to suppress and the 
trial court's ruling thereon, and can in no event be construed as 
invited error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. BUTTERFIELD'S RULE 404(b) 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
(responding to Point I.A, pp. 10-13 of appellee's 
brief) 
The State asserts that Mr. Butterfield has waived his 
rule 404(b) claim. However, as the State candidly admits in 
footnote 2 at p. 10 of appellee's brief, defense counsel did raise 
a rule 404(b) challenge during oral argument on his motion in 
limine. R. 186-7. The State nevertheless attempts to limit that 
challenge to the sub-issue of admission of a video tape, an issue 
not currently before the court. 
The State's argument is hypertechnical, and ignores the 
purposes behind the waiver rule: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of 
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any 
errors before the case goes to the jury. E.g. , State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190, 192-3 (Utah 1976) . This requirement 
also assures that the appellate court will have a record 
of the grounds asserted below. If, however, the record 
on appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has 
been given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, we 
usually will not consider any claim based on that error. 
E.g. , Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
2 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988). 
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error 
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court to correct any error, if error there be. 
Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (footnote 
omitted). See also Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 
1989); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co. , 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 
672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 
1987); Wurst v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, all the purposes of the contemporaneous 
objection rule have been served. The trial court was apprised of 
the asserted error, and provided with all asserted bases for the 
suppression of evidence sought. Rule 404(b) was argued as a basis 
for suppression at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The 
trial court was given an opportunity to rule, and did in fact rule. 
In any event, rule 404(b) is hardly so obscure or arcane 
that the trial court can reasonably say the trial court was unaware 
of its existence. State v. Bartley. 784 P. 2d 1231 (Utah App. 
1989), cited by the State at the suppression hearing (R. 185) is 
specifically a rule 404(b) and rule 403 case. Immediately after 
citing this case, the prosecutor himself argues in terms of 
character evidence. The trial court was well aware of the 
existence of rule 404(b) and its implications. 
The State attempts to have this court treat Mr. 
Butterfield's motion in limine as five separate motions, with five 
3 
separate arguments, and five separate rulings. The waiver rule 
should not allow such fine distinctions. Reference to the rule 
404(b) grounds for suppression during the course of the suppression 
hearing is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Mr. Butterfield's rule 404(b) claim is adequately 
preserved. 
POINT II. MR. BUTTERFIELD7 S PAROLEE STATUS HAD 
MINIMAL PROBATIVE VALUE, AND WAS MERELY 
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO HIS STATUS 
AS A PRISONER. 
(responding to Point I.B, pp. 13-4 of appellee's 
brief) 
Mr. Butterfield's status as a prisoner is an element of 
the crime charged, assault by a prisoner in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990). The State attempts to equate Mr. 
Butterfield's parolee status with his prisoner status. It is true 
that Mr. Butterfield was arrested in part for violating his parole. 
The additional justification, public intoxication, was also grounds 
for his arrest and consequent status as a prisoner of Officers 
Bassi and Heinberg. See e.g., Exhibit 2 (no warrant arrest fact 
sheet indicating Count I, public intoxication) (attached as 
Addendum A); R. 208:141 (testimony of Officer Bassi that Mr. 
Butterfield was arrested for public intoxication); R. 201-2 (at 
motion in limine hearing, defense counsel points out that Mr. 
Butterfield was arrested for public intoxication, and the parolee 
status is merely cumulative grounds for arrest). 
4 
In light of this independent ground for Butterfield's 
arrest, his possible parole violation was merely cumulative as a 
grounds for arrest. "The balancing test of rule 403 thus excludes 
'matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the 
heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.'11 State v. Bartleyf 
784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 1989)x (citing State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989)). Admission of Mr. Butterfield's status 
as a parolee added nothing to the State's case, but did have the 
effect of prejudicing the jury against him. Under the 
circumstances, admission of this evidence was more prejudicial than 
probative. 
Mr. Butterfield's parolee status was minimally relevant, 
was cumulative, and its probative value was far outweighed by its 
prejudicial impact. 
POINT III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REFERENCE TO MR. 
BUTTERFIELD'S PAROLEE STATUS DOES NOT RENDER 
HIS CLAIM INVITED ERROR. 
(responding to appellee's brief at p. 9 (summary) 
and pp. 12-13) 
Defense counsel was the first to mention Mr. 
Butterfield's parolee status. However, there was nothing 
inappropriate about this conduct, and it does not constitute 
invited error. Defense counsel did everything in his power to 
prevent Mr. Butterfield's parolee status from being admitted. He 
ran the appropriate motion, and argued it earnestly. Despite his 
1Cited and quoted by the State for this very proposition at R. 
185. 
5 
best efforts, his motion was denied. Under these circumstances, 
the invited error doctrine does not apply: 
[T]he doctrine [of invited error] does not apply when a 
party, while making the appropriate objections, 
acquiesces in a judicial determination. (People v. 
Perez, [591 P.2d 63, 66 n.3 (Cal. 1979).) As this court 
has explained: "'An attorney who submits to the 
authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making 
appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the 
error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith 
and endeavoring to make the best of a bad situation for 
which he was not responsible.'" (People v. CalioL 724 
P.2d 1162, 1164 (Cal. 1986)], quoting Leibman v. Curtis [, 
291 P.2d 542, 544 (Cal. 1955)].) 
Marv M. v. Citv of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Cal. 1991). 
Accepting the fact that he had lost at the trial court 
level, he logically assumed that the court's ruling and the 
prosecution's opposition to his motion were indicative of the fact 
that the prosecution would introduce evidence concerning Mr. 
Butterfield's parolee status.2 Defense counsel only attempted to 
minimize the impact of this prejudicial information by introducing 
it himself to steal some of the prosecution's thunder. This is an 
accepted trial tactic, and was undertaken in complete good faith. 
Defense counsel had no obligation to renew his motion at 
trial, or refrain from commenting on evidence issue that the State 
indicated it intended to introduce. See State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 
1069, 1071 (Utah 1987) (failure renew objection at trial does not 
2If instead, the prosecution was attempting to trick Mr. Mack 
into introducing this evidence himself, then this prosecutorial 
misconduct should be addressed, and as a minimum sanction Mr. 
Butterfield's claims here should be addressed on the merits. Mr. 
Butterfield does not believe there was any invited error here, but 
if any invited error exists it is the result of the invitation of 
the prosecution in opposing Mr. Butterfield's motion in limine. 
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waive claim raised in pretrial motion before same judge). The 
defense, like the prosecution, was entitled to rely on the trial 
court's rulings on pretrial motions. 
There is no invited error in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Butterfield's parolee status should have been 
suppressed. This case should be remanded for a new trial at which 
his parolee status is suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7£t day of December, 1993. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID P. S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
NO WARRANT ARREST FACT SHEET (Trial Ex. 2) 
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Attesting Officer 
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ss^ ) / i „** ^ ^f» above named attesting officer. 
